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International 
Environmental Law: 
Can it Overcome its 
Weaknesses to Create an 
Effective Remedy for 
Global Warming? 
 
John Burrit McArthur* 
Review of: Daniel Bodansky, The Art and Craft of 
International Environmental Law (Harvard University 
Press 2010). 
Daniel Bodansky’s The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law presents its 
readers with a detailed, sophisticated discussion of the nature of international environmental 
law. It will be a useful introduction for readers coming fresh to this area of law — for law 
students new to the legal world, for lawyers who have operated only within a domestic legal 
system in which there is an accepted court hierarchy and a clear, determinate structure for 
resolving legal questions and enforcing the answers, for environmental activists and 
policymakers looking for a summary of the outlines of pertinent international law, and for 
intellectually curious lay readers who want to better understand the possibilities and 
challenges of the system that ultimately must develop and enforce rules to solve our 
protracted environmental problems, particularly global warming.  The book explains clearly 
the difference between domestic and international legal systems. It describes the theories and 
sources of legitimacy for international legal rules, the tools available to the international 
environmental lawyer, and the players in the international environmental arena. Because it 
is a detailed overview, it can also serve as a useful checklist of ideas, methods, and 
approaches even for experienced lawyers. 
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Of greater interest and importance is Bodansky’s ongoing discussion of whether the 
“system” or “regime” of international environmental law can be viewed as an effective system 
of law.  He returns repeatedly to the puzzle of how one can construct a system of laws without 
an accepted judicial structure. This, of course, is one reason that the study (and practice) of 
international law is of such great interest. In the absence of a clear source for authoritative 
decisions, questions of legitimacy lie much closer to the surface than in settled legal systems 
in which Marbury v. Madison-type fundamentals are not reopened with every decision.   
When operating within our state or federal courts, American lawyers can assume that 
decisions will be decided with finality and then enforced.1 They do not have to devote a 
substantial part of their time to worrying about whether even a decision they win will be 
accepted by parties from whom they seek payment of money or changes in behavior. Yet 
international environmental lawyers, and those seeking changes that can only be effective 
through international law, as is the case of those seeking to address today’s most significant 
environmental problems, have to concern themselves with the challenge of securing 
legitimacy for agreements that often will not be self-enforcing. Whether international 
environmental law can develop into an effective-enough system is the running puzzle in the 
book, with Bodansky ultimately answering the question with a qualified yes. 
I.  The Marked Difference Between Domestic and International 
Law. 
Bodansky is realistic about the difference between domestic and international law and the 
weakness of the international system if measured by the standards we use in thinking about 
domestic law.  He concedes that international environmental law, when judged by domestic 
standards, is a “dismal failure.”2 Lawyers tend to view the test of a legal system as its “legal 
effectiveness”: whether it imposes clear, readily enforceable obligations and brings conduct in 
line with its decisions.3 We think of laws already on the books and subject to court 
enforcement as “hard” law, while treating long-term factors that might lead to new laws as 
“soft” factors. Bodansky, though, argues that even international lawyers (who certainly are 
more comfortable than domestic lawyers in arguing from “generally accepted principles”) 
spend too much time debating the distinction between “hard” and “soft” law. Most 
environmental violations do not lead to direct sanctions in any event and there is no general 
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an arbitrator in various cases over the last 17 years, as an expert in a variety of energy cases, and 
has published many articles on economic, energy, and judicial management issues. He is a 
Distinguished Neutral on the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution panels for California cases and 
Oil, Gas and Energy cases, a member of the American Arbitration Association panels on 
Commercial, Large Complex Cases and its National Energy Panel, a public arbitrator for the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), a member of the London Court of International 
Arbitration, and a panelist for the International Arbitration Centres in Singapore, Hong Kong, 
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1. DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 86 (2010). 
2. Id. at 15. 
3. Id. at 254. 
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“system of legalized dispute settlement” to adjudicate disputes.4  “[C]ourts and arbitral 
tribunals still play only a minor role in addressing international environmental problems.”5 
The most common route to resolving these problems remains under the law of state 
responsibility, which generally is enforced through bilateral agreements developed in state-to-
state negotiations,6 not adjudicated resolutions.  
Parallel to the lack of a single accepted judicial system for establishing authoritative 
decisions is the lack of an enforcement system. Enforcement has, Bodansky admits, never 
been “the strong suit of international law.”7 It requires detection and effective remedies. 
Developing a policing system is difficult when states’ interests in enforcing common rules so 
frequently founder on externalities and the lure of free riding.8     
The difference between this challenge for environmental norms and the voluntarily agreed 
system of private, often arbitrated international commercial disputes can readily be seen. At 
the outset of what usually is a contractual relationship, the parties to an international 
business transaction  — say, companies from different countries who are parties to a sales 
agreement  — ordinarily agree on a contract with enforcement provisions, select a particular 
court jurisdiction or arbitration rules, and do so with one eye on enforceability. The 
 
4. Id. at 99–102. 
5. Id. at 203; see also id. at 247 (claiming that traditional dispute resolution plays a negligible role in 
international law). 
6. Id. at 247; see also id. at 203 (stating that the primary way that internationally broad standards get 
converted into specific rules is through negotiations). Bodansky adds that “the provisions in 
multilateral environmental agreements regarding traditional dispute resolution have gone almost 
completely unused.” Id. at 243. 
7. Id. at 226 (noting the lack of an ultimate judicial authority in the international system). See 
HELMUT BREITMEIER ET AL., ANALYZING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES: FROM CASE 
STUDY TO DATABASE 152 (2006) (asserting that state sovereignty is one of the foundations of 
international law, and at the same time, one of the major barriers to the adoption of international 
rules). But cf. ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 11–12 
(2007) (stating that the view that international law is significantly weaker than domestic legal 
regimes is not universal). See also RODA VERHEYEN, CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
PREVENTION DUTIES AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY 67–68, 81–83, 282–88 (2005) (arguing that 
customary principles of international law provide adequate tools to deal with global warming).  
8. Self-interest and free riders are major problems in interstate relations. In the battle against global 
warming, for instance, one could summarize the history as proving that most states want aggressive 
steps taken against global warming but want other countries to pay for it. Developed nations want 
developing countries to be responsible for their rapidly growing emissions and burgeoning 
populations, and have used their dislike for the differentiated responsibility principle as an excuse 
to refuse to take their own steps, as the United States Senate displayed in its 98:2 adoption of the 
Byrd-Hagel resolution. See infra note 168. Developing countries point to developed nations’ historic 
responsibility for filling the atmosphere with long-lived pollutants, ignore the role of their greater 
population growth in increasing emissions, and say they should not have to begin limiting 
emissions. Developing countries have an incentive to support measures based on per-capita 
emissions, not total emissions, because this removes the rise in emissions caused by population 
growth. from the equation. A similar battle plays out industry by industry when states begin 
thinking about the internal structure of greenhouse-gas limits. Many industries may pay lip service 
to the need to take action, do something, sometime, but each has special reasons, such as jobs, 
economic growth, the cost of replacing sunk investments, and technological infeasibility, as to why 
their industry should have favored status. A timely contemporary example a fascinating example of 
self-interest and free riding is unfolding in the struggle within the European Union to stabilize both 
the euro and member-nation public finances. Every country wants a strong euro and to benefit from 
it; none are particularly eager to volunteer for the costs of funding currency supports or for limiting 
public expenditures.  
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relationship is founded upon a shared expectation of gains from having a mutually accepted 
dispute-resolution system that both sides deem fair enough to settle future disputes. Most of 
the anticipated losses and gains are expected to be internal to the relationship. There is little 
fear that third parties will capture large benefits or escape significant costs.  
It is no surprise that businesses in different countries, and governments contracting with 
foreign businesses, routinely agree to arbitrate disputes under the aegis of one of the 
international arbitration organizations. In this way, they legitimate a structure for their 
particular transaction.9 Over time, repeat use of the same arbitration system by a large 
number of parties can rise to a level in which a given international arbitration-service 
provider’s docket begins to look like an independent court system.  
International environmental disputes, in contrast, unlike international business 
transactions, generally do not fall under an agreed system. The polluter and its victims 
usually are not in a contract relationship. Yet there is no settled system of international 
environmental law to parallel, on a larger scale, domestic rules. Much of The Art and Craft of 
International Environmental Law is devoted to explaining how, in the absence of such a 
system, the world can develop a coherent system to deal with cross-border environmental 
degradation.  
II.  The Pragmatic Art and Craft of International Environmental 
Law. 
One of the best aspects of Bodansky’s book is his catalogue of the techniques through 
which international environmental legal rules have been developed even in the face of the 
major obstacles. Chapter Four, for instance, begins with a discussion of the possible goals of 
environmental controls. These range from the “absolutist” goal of forbidding particular 
environmental harms to balancing approaches, an area where Bodansky focuses mainly on 
cost/benefit analysis, and alternative goals: environmental effectiveness, cost effectiveness, 
and equity.10 It moves on to who should be regulated — states or “private actors.”11 The 
chapter concludes with a useful discussion of nine kinds of information regulation, as well as 
traditional “command-and-control” regulation (whether through “specification,” 
“performance,” or “environmental quality” requirements), and, finally, of “market-based” 
rules. Market rules include not just taxes, charges, subsidies, tradable allowances, and price 
and quantity regulations, but also liability rules.12  For the unversed, the range of potential 
 
9. Chavez Says Venezuela Won’t Accept World Bank Arbitration, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS WEEK (Jan. 10, 
2012), available at http://news.businessweek.com/article.asp?documentKey=1376-
LXHUWK1A74E901-7A3SE6B1K0ETEMM47QS3JH7K9T (discussing Venezuela’s receipt of a 
favorable arbitration award under the auspices of the International Chamber of Commerce, and 
that the path of state-company international arbitration remains a work in progress). 
10. Bodansky, supra note 1, at 57–70.  
11. Id. at 70–71.  
12. Id. at 71–84; see Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1911 (1941). Bodansky includes 
the Trail Smelter case under the rubric of liability rules. Treating liability rules as a “market” device 
is in the Chicago School tradition. If, as Ronald Coase argued, parties can bargain to the optimal use 
of resources from an initial allocations, see Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 
1 (1960), then liability rules can be used to add externalities and other social costs that the parties 
should include in their bargain.  
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measures will be an eye opener. Even for the environmental veteran, it should be useful to 
see the plenitude of policy approaches listed in one place.  
Chapter Six continues the stress on a much broader vision of law than “hard” domestic law 
in its survey of “Who’s Who in the Legal Process.” It discusses not only states and 
international institutions, such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), but 
also non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and business. Bodansky includes both “sources 
of influence” and “pathways of influence” in his NGO discussion13 in order to remind readers 
that, in the absence of a world legislature or world environmental court, individuals seeking 
change often have to consider a wider range of allies and options than when pushing for legal 
rules in the United States.14 A broader framework is of course appropriate to a system in 
which courts are supposed to enforce generally accepted principles. Bodansky lists four of 
these “nontreaty norms” applicable to international environmental law: (1) the precautionary 
principle, (2) the duty to prevent transboundary harm, (3) the duty to protect endangered 
species, and (4) the duty to future generations.15 It is fair to say that the world’s collective 
response to date to its largest environmental problem, global warming, has not truly honored 
any of these four principles. 
Similarly, Chapter Eight, on negotiating agreements, is in part a pointed reminder of the 
frequent benefits of non-legal agreements, which ordinarily are easier to change than tight 
legal agreements. It is also a reminder that fully inclusive participation in international 
environmental agreements, while a long-term goal, may not be necessary for success. As 
Bodansky writes on today’s key environmental challenge, because twelve countries are the 
source of 80% of greenhouse gas emissions,16  “broad participation is not essential to solve the 
climate change problem.”17  
Bodansky offers a similarly nuanced position on the contents of international 
environmental agreements. While a “deep” agreement with extensive requirements may 
seem, ceteris paribus, better than a loose compact with many gaps, a policy of “starting broad 
and deepening” may ultimately trump one of “starting deep and broadening”18 — or 
 
13. BODANSKY, supra note 1, at 108–135. 
14. Id. at 124–130. In fact, the path to change is broader even for domestic legal systems than lawyers 
ordinarily consider, but it is fair to say that the proportion of rules that are already settled and 
enforceable through a hierarchical court system, including in the environmental area, is much 
higher for most domestic legal systems than in the international sphere and its country-to-country 
relationships. 
15. Id. at 191. 
16. Id. at 175. Although one would like to write that twelve countries are “responsible” for or “liable for” 
80% of global warming, that would not be accurate because there is not yet an international regime 
effectively holding countries to account for the emissions that emerge from their territories. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 183–87; see id. at 186 (identifying as initially broad agreements that succeeded in deepening 
over time the 1976 Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against 
Pollution, the 1979 Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Convention, the 1985 Vienna 
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and 1987 Montreal Protocol, the 1992 United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change established in Rio de Janeiro and 1997’s Kyoto 
Protocol (certainly an example on which the jury remains very much out), and the 1979 Bonn 
Convention on Migratory Species). 
 Bodansky suggests a variety of ways in which looser agreements may foster long-term 
environmental progress. Negotiating an agreement with a small number of countries may make it 
easier to develop cohesiveness and expertise. Id. at 174-75. Differential standards, though they raise 
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attempting to start both deep and broad. Critical agreement provisions include updating 
processes and scientific review so that policymakers have the basis to enhance agreements 
over time, adding countries and rules if an initially broad agreement does not secure the 
desired pollution reductions. Bodansky emphasizes pre-negotiation steps and diverse 
processes and later argues that the conference of the parties has emerged as “a new form [and 
clearly, in his view, a frequently effective form] of international cooperation.”19 
The seriousness of Bodansky’s treatment of soft law explains another distinguishing 
feature of his book, his detailed consideration of the ways in which new values (“norms,” in 
his terminology) can be developed. His list of the reasons why states and other actors would 
consider agreeing to binding solutions to environmental problems range from self-interest 
(which he rejects as far too narrow to explain all behavior) to psychological and social factors 
that might lead states to limit their behavior voluntarily.20 His message is that even 
successful international environmental agreements tend to come not from the satisfyingly 
hard process of an inspired, creative lawyer bringing a lawsuit that shuts down a polluter. 
Much more important in this system without a head, particularly because so much of 
environmental law is based on negotiated agreements, is “the state of mind of the actors that 
comprise the relevant community”21 — those whose behavior needs to change, or the states 
that can compel their behavior to change. Bodansky believes that changes in values can be 
more powerful than changes in rules. With luck, the evolution of norms and development of 
more effective procedures for reaching agreement will prove adequate to the challenges of the 
day. 
Bodansky focuses much more on what makes a norm than on whether the result is a 
“hard” legal rule or “soft” principle followed voluntarily.  In describing the “complex” model 
through which norms emerge, he follows the “garbage-can” model of theorists Michael Cohen, 
James March and Johan Olsen,22 an approach famously applied to policymaking in the 
United States, and explained in political scientist John Kingdon’s Agendas, Alternatives, and 
Public Policies.23 Bodansky’s emphasis on the wide range of actors and techniques that can 
get an issue on the policy agenda and turn it into an agreement stems from this approach.  
 
obvious questions of fairness, may encourage participation, particularly by countries that lack the 
capability to institute major changes. Id. at 182. Paradoxically, non-legal agreements may be 
preferable in some circumstances because they can be easier to change, do not require ratification, 
and can also be updated much more easily. Id. at 155-56, 187.  
19. Id. at 269–70. There have been 17 conferences of the parties under the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, for instance, and while these have yet to produce a specific and binding allocation 
of emissions reductions by country, the conferences have attracted worldwide publicity and kept 
global warming unavoidably on the world policy agenda. 
20. Id. at 89–93. 
21. Id. at 101. 
22. See, e,g,. Michael Cohen, James March & Johan Olsen, A Garbage Can Model of Organizational 
Choice, 17 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1 (1972).  Although Bodansky does not cite this seminal article, he 
elsewhere cites another part of March and Olsen’s body of work. See BODANSKY, supra note 1, at 91 
n. 29. 
23 . JOHN KINGDON, AGENDAS ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (2d ed. 2003); see also CHARLES 
LINDBLOM & EDWARD WOODHOUSE, THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS (3d ed. 1993). As described in a 
book that is one of its most potent applications, the garbage-can model analyzes decisions in which 
participants have inconsistent preferences, the way that the decision-making institution functions is 
unclear, and participants combine and dissolve in fluid patterns, by looking at the “streams” of four 
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Among the important features of this policy-stream model is that it allows a much bigger 
role for sources of change that are not part of formal political processes — for instance, roles 
for “policy entrepreneurs” and for scientists — and for unexpected events to set the agenda. 
By focusing on the need for issues to get and remain on the policy agenda, it can encompass a 
wider range of factors that may alter the lawmaking process than can traditional rule-based 
analyses. Lawyers, groups, and scientists concerned about the environment have played vital 
roles in securing change. Bodansky mentions the examples of scientists who realized that the 
ozone hole was growing24 and the role of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) in keeping global warming on the agenda and shifting that agenda to more serious 
remedies as too well known to need detailing. The impact of Rachel Carlson’s Silent Spring in 
spurring the environmental movement is an exogenous event that spawned widespread 
change.25 Key disasters such as the Torrey Canyon oil spill,26 the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, 
the oil crisis in the 1970’s, the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and BP’s recent Macondo spill in the 
Gulf of Mexico are all examples of key events that put major environmental issues on the 
agenda in a way that ordinary legal efforts could not have matched.  
The expansiveness of this model shows up in the variety of forces Bodansky identifies as 
possible reasons why nations adopt treaties, in the breadth of the actors whom he considers 
as possible sources of new environmental rules, and, ultimately, in his optimism about the 
development of new values and rules. His list of “sources” of international environmental 
norms, which ultimately form his key units of analysis, includes (beyond the bread-and-butter 
legal material of judicial and arbitral decisions) not just treaties and decisions of treaty 
bodies, but decisions of international organizations, conference resolutions and declarations, 
“claims” (formal positions) by states, business codes of conduct, and ideas propounded by legal 
scholars and experts.27  Norms may emerge from “more diffuse processes” than treaties, and 
even more general than these are general principles of international law, yet all, Bodansky 
claims, are part of “hard law.” “Soft” sources of international environmental norms cover, in 
his classification, international resolutions, conference declarations, and business codes of 
conduct.28 It is no surprise that, with this broad vision, Bodansky does end up with an equally 
expansive list of reasons why states would join international environmental agreements and 
why they would implement their commitments.29 
 
factors: problems (and how they get on a decision agenda), solutions (including the existing state of 
know-how on any particular problem), participants, and “choice opportunities” – decisions to which 
solutions can attach. KINGDON, supra, at 84-86.  
24. BODANSKY, supra note 1, at 30, 137. 
25. Rachel Carlson published her seminal book in 1962. See generally J. EDWARD DE STEIGUER, THE 
ORIGINS OF MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL THOUGHT ch. 3 (2006). 
26. BODANSKY, supra note 1, at 27, 138 (Bodansky listing the Torrey Canyon and Argo Merchant oil 
spills as events that produced major changes in ocean oil-pollution law).  
27. Id. at 94–96; see id. at 98 (grounding his analysis more closely in a formal institution with at least 
some formal recognition, Bodansky cites Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice with its tri-partite listing for formal sources of international law in treaties, custom, and 
generally accepted principles of law). 
28. Id. at 98–99. 
29. Id. at 159–66 (list of reasons why states may join environmental agreements ranging from the law 
merely codifying an existing state practice, to self-interest, to doing the right thing under the state’s 
values, getting others to join, and because of other relationships with other states or other actors). 
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In domestic law, legal norms have preferential status because they can be sanctioned and 
because courts will apply such rules.30 It makes sense for domestic lawyers to focus on hard 
law — and, indeed, on a relatively narrow part of “hard” law. In common-law systems, 
arguments from custom and generally accepted principles, often dressed up as policy 
arguments, frequently lose to more specific arguments from contract language, a case, or 
statutory text. But Bodansky claims that international law is different for the reasons 
mentioned at the outset: “At the international level, there is no general system of legalized 
dispute settlement, which can adjudicate violations of legal norms. In most cases, dispute 
settlement is not available, regardless whether a norm is legal in nature.” 
What matters more to Bodansky in a practical sense, and what makes a norm  hard or not, 
is, as already discussed, “the state of mind of the actors that comprise the relevant 
community.”31 From this norm-oriented position, Bodansky proposes classifying international 
environmental norms on gradients of strength based upon whether they are produced in a 
“purposive process of norm creation,” are consensual, the extent of their mandatory nature, 
their precision, and whether they are self-implementing or subject to an external enforcement 
system.32 One reason Bodansky focuses so heavily and optimistically on changes in norms, 
rather than hard agreements, may be that he also does not believe that normal measures of 
compliance are the best measure of effectiveness.33  
 
On implementation, Bodansky’s reasons range from a state’s feeling that it “ought” to implement its 
commitments to the underlying norms influencing behavior and the positive or negative 
consequences of not implementing an agreement. Id. at 220-21. All of these factors are filtered 
through the complex forces that may influence the state’s political system. Id. at 221-23. Bodansky 
is also comforted by empirical studies that, he claims, show that states generally implement their 
international agreements, so that insincerity is the exception and not the rule, once a state has 
made a formal commitment. Id. at 229.  
 
 Bodansky offers a similarly nuanced model of why states might not participate in or implement an 
agreement. Id. at 228-31. He devotes more attention to the conditions under which states will enter 
an international environmental agreement than to those that might lead it to fail to perform, 
perhaps at least in part because of his belief that empirical studies show that states generally 
implement the treaties they join, so that “insincere ratification represents the exception rather than 
the norm.” Id. at 229. 
30. Id. at 100–01. 
31. Id. at 101. 
32. Id. at 102–06. 
33. See id. at 30. Bodansky is skeptical that the law of state responsibility, which he characterizes as 
being overly legalistic, static, and formalistic, is as good a way of approaching international 
environmental problems as “flexible, political approaches, involving a wider variety of actors, which 
investigate the sources of non-compliance in a particular case and find appropriate responses.” Id. at 
247-48.  
 Moreover, simple compliance may be a bad indicator of effectiveness, because an environmental law 
may simply have set low standards, id. at 258 (as did Kyoto). In the long term, tight legal 
requirements may not maximize desired behavior, compliance may not be the best predictor of 
desired results, and tight agreements allowing little exit may be self-defeating because they may 
discourage participation. Id. at 270-71. All of these points support Bodansky’s larger theme that 
building support for environmental controls may be far more important than securing the most 
logical agreement as soon as possible. 
 
 This does not mean that Bodansky ignores compliance. His book contains a detailed chapter on 
compliance mechanisms, including very useful sections on securing compliance by a variety of 
information-gathering mechanisms and by providing financial assistance. Id. at 238-45. 
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The garbage-can model of policymaking is liberating because it suggests that a broad 
range of groups have available a wide variety of policy tools they can wield to effectuate 
change. Environmental groups have many avenues open for influence. At the same time, the 
model suggests that those opposing change have similarly broad opportunities, as indicated 
by the success that business groups in the United States have had in blocking meaningful 
progress against global warming.34 The challenge to models broad enough to capture all 
possible sources of change is the same as the challenge of Parsonian social theory in the 
middle of the last century.35 Parson’s model of social action was so inclusive that it could 
incorporate any source of change within psychological, political, economic, social, and cultural 
systems — a great strength of his theory — just as the garbage-can model incorporates many 
paths to political change. But with such broad approaches it becomes harder to generate 
predictions in any given situation. The model may explain change better after the fact than 
narrower theories, but it has more trouble predicting change and providing assurance that 
real change will be coming.  
III. Successes and Failures. 
To bolster his claim for the effectiveness of norm-based shifts, Bodansky discusses the 
success of various international environmental agreements. As background, he divides the 
evolution of that body of law over the last two centuries into three phases. In its formative 
years, in the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, it was primarily a law 
among states, concerned with how states could cooperate on limited economic measures. The 
threats addressed had a narrow focus upon fairly obvious environmental hazards with clear 
causal relationships; agreements targeted the rational use of resources; the actors were 
states, not firms or private individuals; the emphasis was on coexistence among states, not 
cooperation; and resources beyond national boundaries, like oceans, tended to be treated as 
inexhaustible.36 This period did see some state treaties on species preservation — Bodansky 
focuses particularly on treaties over birds and other wildlife and the 1911 North Pacific Fur 
Seals Convention.37   
In a second phase, that of “pollution prevention,” emphasis shifted to preventing 
transboundary harm and to multilateral agreements; progress involved, in some instances, 
agreements binding on private entities; but the focus remained relatively narrow compared to 
today’s concerns.38 This movement was linked to the environmental consciousness that 
culminated in the 1970’s Earth Day celebration and Principle 21 of the Stockholm Conference 
 
34. See generally Judith Layzer, Deep Freeze: How Business Has Shaped the Global Warming Debate in 
Congress, in BUSINESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: CORPORATE INTERESTS IN THE AMERICAN 
POLITICAL SYSTEM 93–125 (Michael Kraft & Sheldon Kamenikci eds., 2007); LINDBLOM & 
WOODHOUSE, supra note 23, at 62–69. 
35. See generally TALCOTT PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION (1937); TALCOTT PARSONS, THE 
SOCIAL SYSTEM (1951); Talcott Parsons,  An Outline of the Social System, in TALCOTT PARSONS, 
THEORIES OF SOCIETY 30–79  (1961).  
36. BODANSKY, supra note 1, at 21, 24–25. 
37. Id. at 18–23 (discussing 1911 North Pacific Fur Seals Convention, 1902 Convention to Protect Birds 
Useful to Agriculture, and 1916 Migratory Birds Convention between the United States and Canada 
and a 1936 treaty between the United States and Mexico). 
38. Id. at 21, 26–30. 
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in 1972. Principle 21 was itself a broader endorsement of the 1941 Trail Smelter principle, 
one emerging from an arbitration, that states have a duty -- i.e., something stronger than a 
discretionary privilege to agree -- to prevent trans-boundary harm.39 In 1972, the same year 
as the Stockholm Conference, the United Nations developed UNEP, one of the primary 
sources of environmental influence, and it has played a “coordinating and catalytic role” ever 
since.40  
In the United States, this was the era of breakthrough legislation in the National 
Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Clean Water Act as well as 
establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency.41 One sign of the breadth of support 
for environmental progress at this time is that these steps occurred under a Republican 
President. Although the issues were broader than in the first phase, the environmental 
movement still was largely a developed-country phenomenon.42 The era was marked by 
progress in multi-lateral treaties, but Bodansky’s examples (the various treaties on ocean 
pollution from tankers) are still relatively narrow (if effective) environmental laws.43 
In a third era, the one of greatest relevance because it encompasses issues of much broader 
scope, particularly climate change, by far today’s most important environmental challenge, 
and because it is the phase still emerging today, emphasis shifted to what Bodansky calls 
“sustainable development.”44 The problems now being addressed are much more intractable 
because they “may require fundamental economic and social change.”45 The issues present 
greater scientific uncertainty, which, among other things, allows those resistant to change to 
hide behind the lack of absolute certainty.46 For example, business interests and their 
political allies bottled up progress on climate change in the United States Congress by 
rejecting the precautionary principle and requiring a level of certainty that is rarely met in 
any decision-making.47 The issues often present a “North-South,” developed-developing 
country divide and can require solutions that involve capacity building and developed-country 
 
39. Id. at 26–27; see United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Sweden, June 
15-16, 1972, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Principle 21, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (June 16, 1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration]. Principle 21 balances 
sovereign states’ right to exploit their own resources with “responsibility to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” Id. 
40. BODANSKY, supra note 1, at 29. 
41. See generally id. at 26. 
42. Id.  
43. See id. at 26–29 (discussing 1954 adoption of International Convention of the Prevention of 
Pollution of the Sea by Oil (OILPOL), the 1958 Convention on the High Seas to forbid ocean 
dumping and the conventions adopted after the Torrey Canyon oil spill in 1967, as well as the 
convening of the Stockholm Conference to begin dealing with the problem of acid rain).  
44. Id. at 21, 30–35. 
45. Id. at 31. Indeed, so far real progress on global warming can be said to have been derailed by 
developed countries’ unwillingness to jeopardize their economic and social position, even at the cost 
of climate disaster, and developing countries’ unwillingness to limit their steps toward quickly 
achieving an economic and social breakthrough that would let them draw even with developed 
countries, even if incurring the same global risk.  
46. Id. at 32–33. 
47. John Burritt McArthur & Rick Harper, Global Warming, the Regulations Ahead, and the Oil and 
Gas Industry, 48 NAT. RES. J. 745, 774–79 (2009).  
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CAN IT OVERCOME ITS WEAKNESSES 
263 
funding for their developing brethren, as was the case with ozone regulation.48  In addition to 
the challenge of severe divisions between rich and poor countries, effective solutions require 
surmounting intergenerational challenges.49 The economic interests of those alive today 
stand in direct, material conflict with those of future generations — even if both should share 
an abstract desire to protect the habitability of the world. Not surprisingly, solutions involve 
much longer periods of time (and, unfortunately, delay in enacting measures against climate 
change carries huge costs) and more complex planning than the challenges of the first two 
phases of environmental law.  
In charting developments across these three periods, Bodansky gives a realistic picture of 
the successes and failures in international environmental law.  
The successes, which are marked, are the fairly standard catalogue of specific, relatively 
limited programs in which solutions were available, national and international economic 
growth was not jeopardized, and compliance could be monitored fairly effectively.  
For instance, Bodansky treats the “first multilateral problem to receive international 
attention,” oil pollution from tankers, as a success with its progression from the 1954 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (OILPOL), the 1958 
Convention on the High Seas, and the tightening of standards after the Torrey Canyon spill 
in the Oslo Convention (Bodansky claims that as a result, today there is “virtually no 
hazardous waste . . . disposed of in the North Sea”50) to the 1972 London Dumping 
Convention and the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution by Ships 
(MARPOL).51  
A second example comes from rules against acid rain, a problem that led to the Stockholm 
Conference in 1972 and, in addition to effective measures against acid rain, to the broader 
impact of the Stockholm Declaration’s Principle 21.52 Third are the concerted efforts against 
ozone pollution that generated the Montreal Protocol and its subsequent tightening after 
scientists determined that the hole in the atmosphere was growing even more rapidly in spite 
of initial reforms.53 Bodansky describes the agreement on ozone as “widely considered to be 
the most successful environmental agreement to date.”54 And, finally, he mentions the 1911 
North Pacific Fur Seals Treaty, claiming that by 1940 the seal population had “returned to its 
pre-hunt levels.”55  
 
48. BODANSKY, supra note 1, at 32.  
49. See id. at 34. 
50. Id. at 259. 
51. Id. at 20, 27, 31, 159-60; see id. at 259–60 & n. 29 (Bodansky claiming that ocean pollution from 
tankers declined from 1,080,000 tons in 1975 to just 16,000 tons in 2002). 
52 . Id. at 28.  
53. Id. at 30–32, 260. 
54. Id. at 30–31; see accord, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008 – 
FIGHTING CLIMATE CHANGE: HUMAN SOLIDARITY IN A DIVIDED WORLD 154 (2007), available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_EN_Complete.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (calling 
Montreal Protocol “[p]erhaps the most successful of all international environmental treaties”).  
55. BODANSKY, supra note 1, at 260; see id. at 82 (the EPA’s experience with cap-and-trade regulations 
for sulfur is frequently cited as another unexpected success story in environmental regulation); see 
generally JEFF GOODELL, BIG COAL: THE DIRTY SECRET BEHIND AMERICA’S ENERGY FUTURE 240 
(2007); Panel Discussion, EBA Climate Change Primer: Cap and Trade, 29 ENERGY L.J. 173, 176–77 
(2008) (comments by Brian McLean, Director, EPA Office of Atmospheric Programs). 
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Arrayed against these positive examples of successful cooperation are areas that Bodansky 
describes as showing little or no progress. For instance, the Trail Smelter arbitration, one of 
the few adjudicated international environmental disputes to yield a written precedent, 
remains to his count “after more than fifty years . . . still the only case in which a state was 
held internationally responsible for causing transboundary environmental harm.”56 The 
arbitration was “successful” in establishing a rule that gets lip service, but has not had the 
desired effect on behavior. “[T]ransboundary pollution seems more the rule than the 
exception in interstate relations.”57 “States acknowledge a duty to prevent significant 
transboundary harm but go on causing such harm.”58 “Pollutants are carried across most 
international borders continuously through the air and by rivers and ocean currents.”59  
Bodansky likens the ineffectiveness of the principle against transboundary harm to that of 
rules against torture. Torture is prohibited by customary international law.60 Victims have 
better legal protection than the environment, and rules against torture are sometimes 
enforced against individuals by the International Criminal Court at the Hague. This is an 
advantage for human rights protection over international environmental protection. Yet 
torture remains “widespread throughout the world.”61 
In another cautionary example, Bodansky notes that even as seemingly concrete an 
achievement in international law as the International Whaling Commission’s very specific 
rules against unrestricted whaling, which seemed such a concrete, adequate set of rules when 
adopted, failed for many years because they did not detect systematic cheating by the Soviet 
Union as it killed over 100,000 whales between 1948 and 1987.62 Success in establishing a 
hard rule was defeated for four decades by a failure to detect and punish. 
Indeed, when Bodansky lists the major environmental challenges facing the international 
community today, he paints a daunting picture: 
 Despite the adoption of the Convention on Biological Diversity in 1992, an 
estimated 50 to 150 species continue to be lost every day. The World Conservation 
Union estimates that almost one in four mammals and one in eight birds face a 
high risk of extinction in the near future. 
 Almost two decades after the emergence of global warming as a significant 
political issue, global emissions of greenhouse gases continue to grow at a rate of 
roughly 1.9 percent per year, and the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol in 
 
56. BODANSKY, supra note 1, at 200. Bodansky does elsewhere include the Lac Lanoux arbitration as a 
second important adjudicated decision, one that established a duty to at least consult and negotiate 
in good faith. Id. at 95.  A common example of the impotence of the international regime to punish 
even the severest pollution by a state is the inaction after the radioactive emissions from the 
Chernobyl nuclear disaster, which somewhat extraordinarily did not see a single affected state take 
legal action. KISS & SHELTON, supra note 7, at 24. There would have been a remedy had the Soviet 
Union signed the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, but it had not. Id.  
57. BODANSKY, supra note 1, at 198–99.  
58. Id. at 202. 
59. Id. at 198–99. 
60. Id. at 199.  
61. Id. (using torture as his example, Bodansky argues that there is a wide gap between the theory of 
customary law, “which emphasizes consistent and uniform state practice,” and the international 
norms described as customary, which often are honored mainly in the breach). 
62. Id. at 225. 
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February 2005 has done little to slow this trend. [In fact, unexpectedly rapid 
economic growth in China and India and other developing countries seems likely 
to cause an unexpected increase in the rate of emissions.]   
 An estimated 12 million hectares are lost to deserts each year, despite the 
adoption in 1994 of a treaty to combat desertification.63 
Bodansky’s overall position on these successes and failures emerges when he answers his 
own question of whether the international environmental regime is effective with a “qualified 
yes.”64 He finds the record thus far cause for optimism:  
“The proliferation of international environmental norms is all the more remarkable given 
the infirmities of the international legal process.”65 From his perspective, the “brief history” of 
international environmental law already has had “some notable successes” and has been 
marked by “impressive ingenuity, developing a wide range of mechanisms to set standards 
and promote implementation.”66 It has led to “[r]egular scientific assessment” to build 
consensus, soft law instruments like codes of conduct, framework conventions and protocols to 
foster incremental progress, tacit amendment procedures, differential standards by ability to 
pay, and elaboration of decisions in a process that is widely accepted even if not formally 
binding.67  
IV.  The Greatest Crisis: Global Warming. 
If the world only faced environmental challenges like the preservation of birds, seals, 
whales, and the reduction of limited-use pollutants like chlorofluorocarbons or even sulfur, it 
would be possible to rest comfortably with Bodansky’s faith that the gradual evolution of 
environmental norms and progress in developing new procedures to reach and extend 
agreements will keep pace with environmental problems. The advances would not be perfect, 
not without unnecessary loss, not without disappointments, but nonetheless ultimately would 
be successful.  But this is not the position facing the world. A massive body of evidence 
suggests that the world is courting a disastrous increase in temperature by its refusal to face 
the cost of limiting emissions. Concomitant damage ranges from melting glaciers and rising 
sea levels to increased drought and floods.  The pace of change and cost of remedies is rising 
 
63. Id. at 260 (footnote omitted).  
64. Id. at 265. To the argument that the overall record is one of failure, Bodansky responds: 
To my mind, this is an overly harsh assessment. Yes, the looming threat of global warming, 
the deterioration of many ecosystems, and the high rates of species extinctions should 
disabuse us of too optimistic an outlook. At the same time, international environmental law 
has had significant successes—the Montreal Ozone Protocol and the North Pacific Fur Seals 
Convention, to name two—so we should not write if off either. 
Id. at 267.  
65. Id. at 136. 
66. Id. at 269. 
67. Id. To Bodansky, this kind of incremental technical advance is likely to yield progress. Id. He 
believes that history has shown that we are far more likely to generate environmental progress 
incrementally by dedicated focus on individual problems than by putting hopes in attempting to 
create a powerful new international regime. Bodansky also believes that the effort that would be 
involved to create an international environmental regime might well outweigh the benefits. Id. at 
268. Yet he admits, quite rightly given the experience of the last few decades, that it is difficult to 
see how to address climate change without stronger international institutions. Id. 
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rapidly with increases in emissions and temperature. The substantial risk of irreversible 
worldwide damage makes this the most important place to test Bodansky’s arguments. 
In Collapse, his survey of vanished civilizations, geographer Jared Diamond argues that a 
variety of well-established civilizations disappeared when, after surmounting various 
environmental challenges, they came to a point where they no longer could overcome the 
environmental degradation they had caused.68 When collapse came, it usually was rapid, with 
the civilization disappearing. Diamond argues that reasons for these catastrophes ranged 
from failure to understand a new challenge on the one hand, to societies that understood that 
they were threatened by vanishing resources but were unwilling to make the sacrifices to 
devise a cure on the other.69 He believes the “most frequent” reason for a civilization’s letting 
itself be destroyed through scarcity is the “most surprising”:70 it understood the threat but 
failed to try to solve it. Among his hypotheses for this seeming irrationality are the tragedy of 
the commons71 (that self-interested behavior overcame the collective interest) and domination 
by elites who believed that their privileged position would save them, if not their society, from 
the effects of environmental disaster. 72 
Diamond’s prognosis fits painfully onto the history of the last two decades. Global 
warming cannot fall into the category of misunderstood crises, because an overwhelming body 
of widely disseminated evidence demonstrates that human activity that emits greenhouse 
gases into the atmosphere is causing a rise in temperature at unprecedented levels, and that 
the consequences will be severe. Global warming has remained on the international political 
agenda in large part, as the policy model applied by Bodansky well explains, because 
scientists have been able to document a crisis much more severe than any single oil spill or 
other isolated environmental catastrophe. At least some effects of warming have appeared in 
very graphic ways. The full impact may be long-term, the causal connections not as intuitive 
as those involved in other policy problems, and climate change even may appear, from the 
perspective of day-to-day life in which the air we breath does not feel different, as a problem 
that can be avoided if one has faith that miraculous technological fixes will appear. Yet the 
issue will not go away.  Cures will require a major change in the consumption of fossil fuels 
and patterns of land use. 
A. The Problem of Global Warming. 
In 1988, the United Nations Environment Program and the World Meteorological 
Organization formed the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. They assembled a 
 
68. JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED (2005) (examples include 
the Maya, Anasazi, various Norse settlements, tribes in New Guinea, and the clans on Easter 
Island). 
69. See generally id. ch. 14. 
70. Id. at 427. 
71. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (classic argument that 
the disappearance of the commons was a triumph of individual aggrandizement over collective 
interest). For an argument that societies can, in fact, cooperate over long periods of time, see ELINOR 
OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 
(1990). 
72. DIAMOND, supra note 68, at 428–31. 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CAN IT OVERCOME ITS WEAKNESSES 
267 
large, diverse body of scientists who could identify areas of international consensus on global 
warming.73 The IPCC is an unusual and vitally important agency. It is the closest thing the 
world has to a body representing the international community in a collective effort to develop 
reliable knowledge about climate change. 
The IPCC has issued four reports. Its Third Assessment report, issued in 2001, was the 
first to put confidence ranges around findings on the effects of global warming.74 The Fourth 
Assessment Report,75 issued in 2007, is its most recent full report. The Fifth Assessment 
Report is underway and scheduled for completion in April 2013.76  
In its Fourth Assessment Report, the IPCC found that 11 of the last 12 years had been the 
warmest on record since 1850.77 The atmospheric level of carbon dioxide (CO2), the most 
pervasive greenhouse gas (GHG), was 379 parts per million (ppm), the highest level in the 
last 650,000 years, and the IPCC found that the increase is very likely due to production and 
consumption of fossil fuels and emissions from agriculture.78 It determined with high 
confidence that the regional consequences of climate changes include increased melting in 
mountain, permafrost, and Arctic/Antarctic areas and rising ocean levels.79  
 
73. For background on the IPCC and its formation, see VERHEYEN, supra note 7, at 18–20. 
74. The Third Assessment Report was the first IPCC report to assign confidence intervals to predicted 
effects of climate change. Id. at 26. Among other things, the report found it very likely that the 
global surface temperatures had increased by 0.6ºC, and that ocean levels had risen between 10 and 
20 centimeters in the twentieth century. Id. at 27.  
75. IPCC, 2007 WORKING GROUP I REPORT, “THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS,” SUMMARY FOR POLICY 
MAKERS (2007) [hereinafter [IPCC 2007 WORKING GROUP I REPORT,]. The author has discussed the 
IPCC’s early work, as well as the United Nations 2007/2008 HDR and the Stern Review, in more 
detail in McArthur & Harper, supra note 47, pt. IV. 
76. See Review of Working Group Contributions to the IPCC 5th Assessment Report (AR5) Has Started, 
IPCC, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ar5/review_of_wg_contributions.pdf (last visited May 2, 
2012). 
77. IPCC 2007 WORKING GROUP I REPORT, SUMMARY, supra note 75, at 5. The discussion in this Part 
presents the international consensus view, as embodied particularly in IPCC reports and work 
based on its approach, to global warming. It treats that evidence of climate change as serious 
enough that under any precautionary principle, a principle the United States accepted when it 
ratified the Framework Convention on Climate Change (see infra note 162 & accompanying text), 
there is enough evidence that a rational world would take steps with a meaningful probability of 
counteracting temperature increases. It does not mean to suggest that this view is unanimous. But 
see No Need to Panic About Global Warming, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Jan. 27, 2012, at A15, col. 1 
(opinion piece against de-carbonization signed by 16 scientists); William Nordhaus, A Review of the 
Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, 14 J. ECON. LIT.  686, 687 (2007) (praising Stern 
Review for adding economic analysis to climate-change analysis, but criticizing various 
assumptions, particularly low intergenerational discount rate, and claiming that findings of other 
major studies have been that measures to slow climate change “involve modest rates of emissions 
reductions in the near term, followed by sharp reductions in the medium and long term.”). Nordhaus 
certainly is correct that the measures used to limit emissions should be the most efficient, and that 
if the world supply of capital can be sharply increased in current years so that controls are easier to 
pay for in some definable future, there can be a tradeoff in which countries consume fossil fuels and 
emit carbon today and pay later. He is also correct that a discount rate near zero is an extremely low 
discount rate. But his analysis misses the differential effects of climate change on poor countries, the 
apparently growing risk of what might once have been considered low-probability “tail” 
catastrophes, and the difficulty that has already been seen in building any collective response to 
global warming. This is hardly a rational time for inaction.  
78. IPCC 2007 WORKING GROUP I REPORT, SUMMARY, supra note 75, at 2-3. 
79. Id. at 5-9.  
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The 2007 Report projected large additional temperature increases with the likely increase 
ranging from 2.4º to 6.4º Celsius by the end of the twenty-first century, although the impact of 
this finding is muted because the report contains probability ranges for various increase 
scenarios instead of a single prediction.80  Many scientists treat a 2ºC increase as the outer 
limit of manageable increases, and a number of them are coming to believe that even this is a 
too-dangerous increase.81 
The 2007/2008 United Nations Human Development Report (HDR) cited the Fourth 
Assessment Report as “establish[ing] an overwhelming scientific consensus that climate 
change is both real and man-made.”82 The IPCC concluded that keeping global carbon 
emissions down to 2005 levels will require “a large shift in investment parameters,” even 
though the additional spending, if begun at that time, would have ranged from “negligible to 
5-10%” of world GDP.83 More recently, the IPCC has reported that it now measures the 
concentration of carbon dioxide at 390 ppm, an increase of another 11 ppm even since its 2007 
work.84  
The IPCC’s work accords with the 2006 Stern Review, a report by Sir Nicholas Stern 
commissioned by Britain’s Prime Minister.85 Stern found rising GHG emissions “the only 
plausible explanation” for increased temperatures over the last 50 years.86 The rise “will” 
affect access to water, food, health, and the environment worldwide.87  An economist, Stern 
predicted that failing to act could cost the world 5% of GDP each year “now and forever,” with 
some higher-range estimates rising to as much as 20% of GDP, while the cost of taking 
corrective action, though great, could be limited to 1% of GDP if remedial action began right 
away.88 The next 10 to 20 years — whether the world takes corrective action in the two 
decades after 2006 — would, he argued, have “a profound effect” on climate in the rest of the 
century and thereafter.89 So far, of course, the world has failed to implement any solution 
with a reasonable probability of effectiveness. 
Stern reported that the concentration of CO2 had increased from 280 ppm in 1750, a 
benchmark for the preindustrial environment, to 380 ppm, an increase of 100 ppm in roughly 
250 years, but would rise another 170 ppm in just the next 30 to 45 years.90 Overall 
emissions, including other greenhouse gases, had risen to 430 ppm of “CO2 equivalent” and 
 
80. Id. at 13. 
81. See, e.g., 2007/2008 HDR, supra note 54, at 7. For a powerful argument that even the current 
increase is too much and that we already are experiencing uncontrolled feedback magnification of 
warming effects, see James Hansen’s argument in notes 145-57 & accompanying text infra.  
82. 2007/2008 HDR, supra note 54, at 12. 
83. IPCC, 2007 WORKING GROUP I REPORT, supra note 75, SYNTHESIS REPORT, at 58. 
84. O. Edenhofer et al., IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change 
Mitigation, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 3 (2011), available at 
http://srren.ipcc-wg3.de/report (last visited May 2, 2012). 
85. SIR NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2006) available at 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/Executive_Summary.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2012). 
86. Id. at 6. 
87. Id.  
88. Id. Writing in 2000, Yale economist William Nordhaus and a colleague estimated that global 
warming would reduce global GDP by 3%. WILLIAM NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE 
WORLD: ECONOMIC MODELS OF GLOBAL WARMING 96 (2000).  
89. STERN, supra note 85, at 6. 
90. Id. at 3.  
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are rising at 2.3 ppm per year.91 Even if emissions were capped at existing levels, the CO2 
equivalent level of GHG’s still would rise to 550 ppm by 2050, an increase of 270 ppm from 
preindustrial levels.92  
Worse yet, these dire figures do not fully portray the risk because they are averages. They 
conceal the “risk of outcomes much worse than expected,” risks that “are very real and could 
be catastrophic.”93 To avoid such catastrophe, the world needed to reduce carbon emissions by 
60% to 70% by 2050.94 As subsequent events have shown, the use of a period this long was 
unfortunate. It has enabled opponents of change to act as if we still have several decades to 
negotiate remedies, and only need to implement them at the end of this period. The fact is 
that every year of delay pushes accumulated emissions higher and makes remedies more 
costly at any given level of technology. 
The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment report and the Stern Review were joined by the United 
Nations’ 2007/2008 HDR, which devoted itself to climate change as a threat to human 
welfare. This HDR described climate change as “now an established fact,” one that is “already 
starting to affect some of the poorest and most vulnerable communities around the world.”95 
The crisis is “the defining human development issue of our generation.”96 Continuing 
emissions are “running up an unsustainable ecological debt that future generations will 
inherit. We are drawing down the stock of environmental capital of our children.”97  
The HDR noted that developed countries with only 15% of the world’s population still were 
accounting for half of world emissions.98 To curb rising temperatures, it concluded that these 
countries would have to reduce carbon emissions by 30% by 2020 and 80% by 2050.99 It 
viewed failure to act, which so far characterizes the ineffectiveness of the various treaties and 
declarations on global warming, as coming from failures of political will, not technological or 
economic constraints, and claimed (with an eye to the consequences) that the failure would be 
“a moral failure on a scale unparalleled in history.”100 
 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at iii. 
93. Id. at ix. One reason for the impact of the Stern Review was the graphic nature of its warnings. It 
predicts that temperature increases will release large volumes of stored methane and CO2 from 
thawing permafrost and peat bogs. Id. at 10. Warming will reduce the oceans’ ability to continue 
absorbing carbon dioxide, and, because oceans absorb the great majority of warming’s direct effects, 
warming will create a cumulative increase in heat released back into the atmosphere, even if 
emissions stop increasing today. Id. at 11-12. Climate change may weaken the Atlantic Ocean’s 
temperature circulation in a way that significantly cools Europe and the East Coat of North 
America. World sea levels will continue to rise, with substantial pressure from the melting 
Greenland and Antarctic Ice Sheets. Id. at 15-16. 
94. Id. at xii. 
95. 2007/2008 HDR Report, supra note 54, at 3; see id. at 9 (finding an inverse relationship “between 
responsibility for climate change and vulnerability to its impacts”). 
96. Id. at 7 (HDR predicts that climate change “will undermine international efforts to combat 
poverty”).  
97. Id. at 9. 
98. Id. at 14. 
99. Id. at 127; see also id. at 48 (aggressive emission reductions fit a model in which world emissions 
would fall 50% by 2050). Presumably rapidly rising emissions in Asia have made even the HDR 
projections of necessary reductions outdated and too low. 
100. Id. 
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A 2010 UNEP study of the “emissions gap” between the commitments at the 2009 
Copenhagen Conference and those needed to hold temperature increases within 1.5º to 2º 
Celsius found that even if all existing pledges are implemented, but emissions then stay at 
2020 levels for the rest of the century, the expected temperature increase will be between 2.5º 
and 5º Celsius.101 Keeping temperatures within Copenhagen’s target of a 1.5º to 2º increase 
would require “emissions levels . . . to be lower in 2020” and “considerable reductions” 
thereafter.102  
The most recent HDR, the 2011 report, returns to environmental policy as its central 
theme because it views global warming as “the great developmental challenge of the 21st 
century” and rising temperatures as a force that threatens to reverse the positive trend in 
human development over recent decades.103 The HDR’s good news is that the overall human 
development index (HDI) has risen “dramatically” by 41% since 1970, and by 61% in low-HDI 
countries.104 But this progress has come at a price. The production needed to lift development 
standards has left 40% of the world’s land degraded, caused a wide spread of deforestation 
and desertification, made the take from fisheries unsustainable, and is a reason that so many 
species are disappearing.105 Furthermore, if emissions continue to increase, the expected 19% 
increase in the overall HDI index by 2050 will instead be 8% to 15% below current levels. This 
is a sharp break from the years of consistent progress since World War II.106 
The United Nations finds “overwhelming evidence that we are reaching an upper limit to 
our capacity to emit greenhouse gases without dire consequences,” charges that “[w]e are 
gambling with our planet through ‘games’ in which private individuals reap the benefits 
while society bears the costs,” and argues that given uncertainties about the capacity of the 
ecosystem and technology the risk of a “disastrous system-wide collapse is not negligible.”107 
The picture is bleaker when the source of new emissions is considered because so many 
recent increases are due to economic development in poorer countries — a prime goal of 
international development efforts. Dividing countries into low, medium, high, and very high 
HDI countries, the bulk of emissions still come from traditionally developed countries, the 
very high HDI countries. With only one-sixth of the world’s population, these countries 
accounted for 64% of CO2 emissions from 1850 to 2005, with the United States responsible for 
 
101. U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, THE EMISSIONS GAP REPORT: ARE THE COPENHAGEN PLEDGES SUFFICIENT 
TO LIMIT GLOBAL WARMING TO 2º OR 1.5º?, TECHNICAL SUMMARY, at 9 (Nov. 2010)  
102. Id. 
103. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011: SUSTAINABILITY AND EQUITY, A 
BETTER FUTURE FOR ALL, at 30-31 [hereinafter 2011 HDR REPORT].  
104. Id. at 13. Other good news is that the real cost of food is “much lower” than 50 or 200 years ago, and 
the energy-cost of output in the United States is estimated at one-fifth of that in 1800. Id. at 15. 
Data like these indicate a long-term increase in human welfare. This latest Human Development 
Report has some good environmental news, too; it recites, for instance, that 25% of the global energy 
capacity is from renewables, which currently account for 18% of electricity consumed. Id. at 9.  
105. Id. at 4, 37-39. The HDR reports that the average sea level, which has risen twenty centimeters 
since 1870, is expected to rise thirty-one centimeters from 1990 to 2100 if current accelerated 
temperature increases continue, and that climate changes are “increasing the likelihood of extreme 
weather events, such as droughts, storms and floods.” Id. at 35-36. 
106. Id. at 2, 30-31. 
107. Id. at 16-17. The HDR also contains an extended discussion of the relationship between income 
inequality and environmental degradation and the higher impact on poorer nations that have fewer 
resources to protect themselves. 
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30% of total CO2 emissions in that period.108 Very high HDI countries cumulatively have 
generated roughly nine times more carbon per capita than low, medium, and high HDI 
countries (an added responsibility that, as the HDR points out, is a rationale for the “common 
but differentiated responsibilities” standard under Kyoto, in which developed countries are to 
lead in cleanup).109 In very-high HDI countries, a person causes four times the CO2 emissions 
and two times the methane and nitrous oxide emissions of a person in a low, medium or high 
HDI country, and the activity of a person living in very high HDI countries releases 
approximately thirty times the CO2 as those in low-HDI countries.110 
In recent years, however, the growth in emissions has been coming predominately from 
developing countries. Rising HDI values have little relationship with emissions at low HDI 
levels, but as HDI scores rise there is a “tipping point” at which income and CO2 emissions 
become correlated.111 Success in achieving high levels of development, in other words, one of 
human society’s long-term goals, ensures rising emissions levels. Countries that raised HDI 
levels faster also raised per-capita emissions levels faster.112 Since 1970, CO2 emissions in 
low, medium and high HDI countries have increased by 248% , while those in very high HDI 
countries have risen at a too-high but much lower rate of 42% .113 Low, medium, and high 
HDI countries account for over three-fourths of carbon emissions growth since 1970.114 A 
chart of average world temperatures shows increased temperatures taking off after 1980;115 
thus rising temperatures have paralleled, ironically, the period of greatest activity to curb 
emissions. Of the three main factors that have contributed to rising emissions, population 
growth, higher consumption, and carbon intensity of production, rising consumption produced 
a 91% increase on its own, rising population a 79% increase on its own, while carbon intensity 
has fallen and contributed a negative 70%.116 
The problem, of course, is that the natural consequence of economic growth, the primary 
goal of most countries, is to increase the rate of greenhouse gas emissions. Even though 
“carbon intensity of production” has fallen by 52% in very high HDI countries, total emissions 
and emissions per capita have “more than doubled” since 1970 and are 112% higher than in 
1970.117 Average world per-capita emissions have also risen 17% over that period. Not 
surprisingly, success in economic development has gone hand in hand with environmental 
degradation. 
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration publishes an Annual Greenhouse 
Gas Index of all greenhouse gases. Its most recent index shows that gases have increased by 
 
108. Id. at 33. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 24. 
111. Id. at 3. 
112. Id. at 3, 25. As a result, “the evidence is consistent with a causal relationship where rising HDI—or 
at least the income component—implies higher greenhouse gas emissions in the future.” Id. at 28. 
113. Id. at 32. 
114. Id. at 33. 
115. Id. at 32. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
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29% since 1990.118 Carbon dioxide, the dominant pollutant, and nitrous oxide have increased 
steadily since 1990; methane, which was not initially increasing in that period but is twenty-
five times more “potent” than carbon dioxide, has risen for the last four years.119 This is a 
particular concern because of methane’s much greater potency. Far from putting the world on 
the way to a reduction from 1990 levels by 2012, the FCCC, Kyoto, and the many other 
international efforts to date have not stemmed the increase in greenhouse gas emissions. 
Similarly, the World Meteorological Organization’s late-2011 Greenhouse Gas Bulletin 
reports a 39% increase in carbon dioxide in the atmosphere since 1750 (the benchmark of 
“pre-industrial levels”), a 158% increase in the lower-volume but much more invasive and 
longer-lived methane, and a 20% increase in nitrous oxide.120 CO2 emissions account for 80% 
of the increase in recent decades.121 The emissions, “directly connected with human activity,” 
are linked to burning fossil fuels, deforestation, and land use change.122 The world has been 
fortunate (at least, it has been able to buy time) because 45% of the CO2 emissions from fossil-
fuels have been absorbed by “oceans and the terrestrial biosphere.”123 But these two sinks will 
become less effective, as the Stern Review predicts, as the oceans absorb increasing amounts 
of CO2 and forests continue to disappear. Even though no one knows where the tipping point 
is with absolute certainty, the world is gambling with the uncertainty over whether the 
cumulative effects of climate change, including feedback effects, have reached a point of no 
return. 
Then there is the grim World Energy Outlook 2011 from the International Energy Agency 
(IEA).124 The IEA report generally focuses on the supply and demand of energy. It considers 
such practical issues as whether there is sufficient capital investment to satisfy projected 
energy demand. The report, however, also paints a dire picture of global warming. It 
describes “the energy decisions necessary to contain the rise in average global temperature to 
2º Celsius” as in the category of “decisions that must be made without delay.”125 Even though 
Kyoto and its progeny have focused on the developed world, the IEA notes that 90% of the 
population increase in 2010-2035, 70% of the economic growth, and 90% of the emissions 
increase is expected to come from non-OECD countries — from developing countries, 
including particularly China and India.126 
 
118. NOAA Greenhouse Gas Index Continues Climbing, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC 
ADMINISTRATION (Nov. 9, 2011) [hereinafter NOAA], available at 
http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2011/20111109_greenhousegasindex.html.(last visited August 
18, 2012). 
119. Id. 
120. Green House Gas Bulletin: The State of Greenhouse Gases in the Atmosphere Based on Global 
Observations through 2010, WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION (Nov. 21, 2011), available at 
http://www.wmo.int/pages/mediacentre/press_releases/documents/GHGbulletin.pdf. (last visited 
August 21, 2012). 
121. Id. (citing NOAA statistics). 
122.  Id. at 2. 
123. Id. 
124. INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2011 (2011). For other summaries of 
the climate change issue, see DANIEL YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND THE REMAKING 
OF THE MODERN WORLD, chs. 21-26 (2011); THOMAS FRIEDMAN, HOT, FLAT AND CROWDED 28-49 
(2008). 
125. 2011  WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK, supra note 126, at 4. 
126. Id. at 39. 
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Much of this growth is desperately needed and will achieve major increases in human 
welfare if accomplished: 1.3 billion people still lack electricity and 2.7 billion still burn 
biomass for cooking.127 But raising standards of living for billions of poor, to say nothing of 
the billions more hoping to achieve developed world standards, will increase emissions even 
more. Even if cars improve fuel mileage, for instance, the number of cars is expected to double 
to 1.7 billion by 2035 (with the “center” of automobile manufacturing moving to non-OECD 
countries).128 China’s energy emissions already are 40% greater than those of the United 
States, even though its per-capita emissions are only one-third of U.S. levels.129 Any move 
closer to the consumption-rich American lifestyle by China or India, however desirable it 
might be on other grounds, will bring huge new emission increases. 
The IEA projects that if the world follows what it labels a “New Policies” scenario, under 
which countries only implement existing articulated commitments and which is, somewhat 
discouragingly, the IEA’s “central scenario,” temperatures will rise by more than 3.5º 
Celsius.130 It admits that some prominent scientists now believe that even a 2º rise may be 
disastrous.131 Foreseeable consequences of a more than 3.5º temperature increase are “a sea 
level rise of up to two metres, causing dislocation of human settlements and changes to 
rainfall patterns, drought, flood, and heat-wave incidence that would severely affect food 
production, human disease and mortality.”132 A drying Amazon would release more CO2 and 
increase the temperature further, as would melting arctic permafrost.133 In other words, 
feedback effects begin magnify the increases beyond the already dire assumptions in past 
IPCC work. And if countries do not implement even their existing commitments, as they 
generally have not thus far under the Kyoto framework, the trajectory is for an increase of 
6º Celsius or more.134 
The daunting nature of the challenge can be seen in the requirements for the IEA’s 
alternative “450 Scenario” — the bigger steps necessary to cap greenhouse emissions at a 450 
ppm CO2 equivalent and have a 50% chance (but only a 50% chance) of holding temperature 
increases to 2º Celsius. Even such a relatively limited temperature increase, which until 
recently seemed to be a consensus target and has been the FCCC-based goal, is beginning to 
look as if it would have disastrous consequences and is too great an increase.135 Fully 80% of 
 
127. Id. at 39, 45. 
128. Id. at 41. 
129. Id. at 208. 
130. Id. at 40, 69–70, 205, 210. 
131. Id. at 207. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 40, 210. 
135. For the goal of a 2º average temperature increase, see The Copenhagen Accord, Draft Decision 
1/CP.15 §§ 1-2 (Dec. 18, 2009), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l1a01.pdf 
(referencing a goal of holding temperature increase to 2º Celsius) (last visited July 24, 2012); The 
Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for 
Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol at its Fifteenth Session, Decision 1/CP.16 (Mar. 15, 2011), 
available at 
http://unfccc.int/documentation/decisions/items/3597.php?such=j&volltext=%22cancun%20agreemen
ts%22#beg (discussing improving knowledge for keeping the increase to a lower 1.5º rise)(last visited 
July 24, 2012); for arguments that such an increase is too great, see infra notes 143-55 & 
accompanying text. 
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the capital stock of power plants, industrial capital, and buildings already is “locked-in”; if 
measures more aggressive than current “New Policies” are not implemented by 2015, the 
infrastructure generating 95% of permissible emissions will be in place, and if no steps are 
taken by 2017, just five years away, all of the infrastructure will be installed.136 Any added 
carbon-emitting infrastructure after that will have to be matched by offsetting changes, 
including mothballing existing facilities on whom someone will have to bear the sunk loss. 
Yet even many of the wealthiest, most developed countries are not on the road to 
implementing their current commitments. The most recent promises, at the 2011 Durban 
Conference of the Parties, ignore the need to achieve Kyoto standards and instead authorize 
development of yet another set of commitments while pushing the date back to 2015, with 
implementation not having to come until 2020.137 This is a major retreat, and it teaches 
precisely the wrong lesson: that there is no urgency about climate-fixing deadlines. In fact, 
the commitments for developed countries that grew out of Rio and Kyoto must be minimum 
standards. For temperatures to be kept to a 2º increase or less, all countries will have to do 
significantly better than current commitments. 
The IEA’s description of the assumptions behind its 450 Scenario includes changes that, 
thus far, the world has not shown itself ready to implement (even if some countries pay lip 
service to them). To achieve 450 Scenario emission levels, all OECD countries would have to 
have CO2 pricing systems in place by 2025, and all oil-importing countries would have to end 
fuel subsidies by 2020, while oil-exporting countries would end subsidies by 2035.138 The 
recent mass resistance to Nigeria’s effort to end a level of oil subsidies that is crippling other 
public spending is a reminder of the heroic nature of this goal. The share of fossil fuels in 
world energy production will have to drop from 81% in 2009 to 62% in 2035; “energy-related” 
CO2 emissions in the EU will have to fall to 49% below 2009 levels by 2035, with renewables 
rising to 43% of energy used by that date; and energy-related CO2 emissions in the United 
States will have to drop by 56% from 2009 levels by 2035, while renewables climb to 38% of 
its energy mix.139 There will have to be a strong increase in nuclear power, particularly in the 
non-OECD world,140 a shift that will require overcoming the reaction to the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear disaster, the failure to resolve the spent fuel disposal problem, and efforts to 
limit the spread of nuclear weapons. The 450 Scenario model projects $36.5 trillion dollars in 
energy infrastructure spending in the next twenty-five years, and, ironically, somewhat more 
in the New Policies assumptions.141 Delaying increased measures to 2020, which is the 
natural consequence of the structure of the Durban Platform discussed will require greater 
expenditures to compensate for higher emissions, with each dollar of investment avoided in 
 
136. 2011  WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK, supra note 126, at 205, 229-235.  
137. See Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, Draft 
Decision CP.17, available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/durban_nov_2011/decisions/application/pdf/cop17_durbanplatform.pd
f (last visited July 24, 2012). 
138. 2011  WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK, supra note 126, at 211, 221. 
139. Id. at 212, 218-19. 
140. Id. at 212, 214. Increased nuclear generation of electricity could be avoided by substituting 
alternative renewable fuels, but that the scale of substitution would require a sharp increase in the 
growth of other renewables.  
141. Id. at 224-25 (Incl. Fig. 6.10). 
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the 2011–2020 period estimated to require a $4.30 expenditure between 2021 and 2035.142 Sir 
Nicholas Stern warned the world about the sharply rising cost of delay six years ago, but the 
world has ignored his advice. It will take concerted, persistent effort to do better now.  
Perhaps most sobering of all is recent work by NASA scientist James Hansen, whose 
Senate testimony in 1998 was one of the most significant consciousness-raising events in the 
United States related to global warming. Hansen has argued that what appears to be the 
great good fortune of the United States and Canada – that they have massive additional 
reserves of oil and gas embedded in shale – will be “game over for the climate” if these 
hydrocarbons, with their concomitant carbon emissions, are produced.143 A paper he recently 
coauthored argues that the climate system has “great inertia” because the “4-kilometer deep 
ocean and 2-kilometer thick ice sheets” absorb heat and slow changes in the natural and 
human world.144 This cushioning, which of course is a short-term blessing, is unfortunate 
because it disguises the larger changes that are underway and encourages delay. Fossil fuel 
emissions have accelerated since Kyoto, now rising by 2.5% a year instead of the 1.5% of the 
two decades before that conference.145 Hansen reviews evidence that the longer-term effects 
of warming are catching up with the continuous injection of carbon into the atmosphere: (1) 
the Antarctic summer-sea ice cover was 30% less in 2007 than a few decades earlier; (2) the 
Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets are shedding ice at an accelerating rate; (3) mountain 
glaciers are receding rapidly; (4) the area of subtropic climate has expanded; (5) coral reefs 
are markedly disappearing; and (6) mega-heat waves have become more common.146 All this 
has occurred with a temperature increase of less than 1º above preindustrial levels.147 
Moreover, these changes are only the effects of the quickest feedbacks because a few decades 
are next to nothing in geologic time; “slow feedback” impacts are more difficult to predict 
accurately, but among their potentially calamitous effects are large-scale methane release 
from sea beds.148  
To give a sense of the risk, Hansen reminds us that the ice age was induced by “minor 
perturbations” in the Earth’s orbit and spin, which were amplified as the resulting higher 
temperatures’ melted ice, increased the area of earth’s land open to absorbing sunlight, and 
caused the oceans and soil to release more CO2 and other greenhouse gases.149 He concludes 
 
142. Id. at 235. 
143. James Hansen, Game Over for the Climate, N.Y. Times (May 9, 2012), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/opinion/game-over-for-the-
climate.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print” (last visited August 22, 2012). 
144. James Hansen et al., The Case for Young People and Nature: A Path to a Healthy, Natural, 
Prosperous Future at 1, available at 
http://www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/mailings/2011/20110505_CaseForYoungPeople.pdf (last visited 
August 22, 2012). 
145. Id. A paper just issued by the Earth Land Temperature Project estimates that “global land mean 
temperature” increased by .87º over the last 50 years, comparing the period 1950-1960 with 2000-
2010. Robert Tohde et al., A New Estimate of the Average Earth Surface Land Temperature 
Spanning 1753 to 2011, available at http://berkeleyearth.org/pdf/results-paper-july-8.pdf (last visited 
August 22, 2012). 
146. Hansen et al., supra note 146, at 5. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 13. 
149. Id. at 6. 
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from changes seen today that the world already is “close to or into the ‘dangerous zone,’” with 
both species and ecosystems plunged into an environment with which they have no “recent 
evolutionary experience.”150  He charts the well-known likelihood of rising sea levels, 
expansion of warm climate zones, species loss, coral-reef loss, increasingly extreme storms, 
glacier disappearance, and decline in human health.151 
It is appropriate to leave the topic with Hansen’s assessment of what is at stake, given 
that he has long been one of the leaders among mainstream climate scientists. Climate 
changes will continue to increase if we keep burning fossil fuels even at current levels.152 In 
spite of talk about the grave challenge and two decades of conferences and agreements, 
governments have done nothing to change the “business-as-usual fossil fuel emissions.”153 
The costs of inaction will fall on the young and future generations.154 To Hansen, this is a 
deep problem of ethics, not just an issue of economics: 
It is a matter of morality – a matter of intergenerational justice. The blame, if we fail to 
stand up and demand a change of course, will fall on us, the current generation of 
adults. Our parents honestly did not know that their actions could harm future 
generations. We, the current generation, can only pretend that we did not know.155 
B. The Ineffectual World Response to Date: Rio Via Kyoto to Durban. 
If so many reports have documented the deepening crisis and kept it on the policy agenda, 
what has been the response within international environmental law? Is a legal framework in 
place to achieve the significant emissions reductions needed? How have Bodansky’s 
developing norms and new procedures done in practice in this most critical area? 
The legal source of current efforts goes back to the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Out of that conference came the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the FCCC, which codified the 
principles that the signatories agreed should apply to any comprehensive treaty to limit 
GHG’s to levels that “would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system.”156 The FCCC, which the United States ratified, adopted core principles that ever 
since have guided the faltering international efforts to develop an effective mechanism to cap 
GHG emissions: 
(1) developed counties will have to lead in reducing GHGs, a duty harbored in the 
FCCC’s language that countries have “common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities”;157 
 
150. Id. at 7. 
151. Id. at 15-19  
152. Id. at 20. 
153. Id.; see id. at 21 (“The transition to a post-fossil fuel world of clean energies is blocked by a 
fundamental fact, as certain as the law of gravity: as long as fossil fuels are the cheapest energy, 
they will be burned.”)  
154. Id. at 21. 
155. Id. 
156. FCCC, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (Mar. 24, 1994) [hereinafter FCCC]. For a more detailed discussion of the 
FCCC and the Kyoto Conference, see McArthur & Harper, supra note 47, at 770-79. 
157. FCCC , supra note 158, art. 3.1. As part of establishing differential responsibilities, Annex I listed 
the developed countries, including the United States, and required that they “shall adopt national 
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(2) developing countries will not have to reduce emissions immediately,158 the rationale 
being that they should be allowed to continue the climb out of poverty that developed 
countries already have completed; 
(3) developed countries will provide funds to assist developing countries through a 
“Financial Mechanism” that will assist developing-country GHG reductions;159 and 
(4) climate changes should be judged under the precautionary principle, the generally 
accepted principle of international environmental law that “[w]here there are threats of 
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a 
reason for postponing such measures.”160 
The FCCC principles were fleshed out in 1997’s Kyoto Conference of the Parties, an 
ambitious global conference that was supposed to operationalize those principles.161 The 
resulting Kyoto Protocol contains specific reduction requirements for “Annex I” developed 
countries, but no requirements for developing countries.162 Developed countries were to 
reduce emissions of six GHG’s to on average 5% below 1990 levels by between 2008 to 
2012.163 Specific reductions varied by country, with the United States, for instance, a country 
that increased emissions between 1990 and 1997, to reduce its emissions to 93% of 1990 
levels.164 The Kyoto Protocol followed the FCCC by including a mechanism for developed 
countries to aid their developing counterparts by creating a “clean development mechanism” 
(CDM), under which Annex I developed countries could gain credit for reducing emissions in 
developing countries.165 
The Kyoto Protocol’s reductions of Annex I country emissions to an average of 5% below 
1990 levels would not, of course, halt the increase in global warming. But the hope was that 
the initial steps would begin right away and foster deeper efforts while stimulating new 
technologies. The disappointing result, beginning with the United States’ failure to ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol and ending with Canada’s recent withdrawal, has been much different.166 
 
policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change.” Id. Annex B listed 
their reduction assignments. 
158. Id. art 3.2, 4.2(a). 
159. Id. art. 4.3. 
160. Id. art. 3.3. 
161. For a general discussion of the role of a Meeting or Conference of the Parties, see BODANSKY, 
supra note 1, at 119; see also KISS & SHELTON , supra note 7, at 79-81. 
162. Kyoto Protocol, art. 3.1-2, Annex I (1998), available at 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (last visited May 2, 2012). 
163. Id. at 174.  
164. Id. Annex I.  
165. Id. art. 12. 
166. See generally McArthur & Harper, supra note 47, at 775–76 (illustrating the failure of the U.S. to 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol). The deep resistance in the United States is exemplified by the Byrd-
Hagel Resolution, which claimed that exempting developing countries from mandatory reductions 
“is inconsistent with the need for global action on climate change and is environmentally flawed,” 
and that the differences in requirements for Annex I countries and developing countries “could 
result in serious harm to the United States economy.” S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997), The Resolution 
also gave the “sense of the Senate” that the United States should not sign any protocol or agreement 
related to the FCCC or the Kyoto Protocol (or subsequent measures) “unless the protocol or other 
agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce GHG emissions for 
Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period,” and even then should not do so 
unless the protocol or agreement would not “result in serious harm to the economy of the United 
States.” Id. President Bush formally repudiated the Kyoto Protocol in early 2001, after he had 
campaigned on supporting it. Bush complained that the Protocol “would cause serious harm to the 
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GHG emissions are mounting so rapidly that no advance in “norms” has been able to keep 
pace. The Kyoto Protocol included an agreement that developed countries should show 
“measurable progress” by 2005 in reducing emissions to its weak requirements. That goal, 
with the United States supposed to be underway to its 7% reduction by 2012, now seems 
hopelessly optimistic. Recent data from the Environmental Protection Agency shows that this 
country’s GHG emissions increased by 7.3% between 1990 and 2009.167 In 2010, the United 
States did indicate its “intent to associate with the Copenhagen Accord” and to reduce 
emissions by 17% below 2005 limits, a higher benchmark, of course, than 1990 emissions, by 
2020, a later date.168 Presumably most other countries will view this commitment as a floor, 
not a ceiling, on the country’s commitment in the post-Durban negotiations over emission-
reduction commitments. But the United States is not on a path to meet even these low 
commitments. Most other major emitters are also behind on their commitments. Wealthy oil-
rich producers, the once progressive country of Canada, and even Japan have increased 
emissions, while unexpectedly buoyant economies like those in China and India, two 
countries that are not Annex I countries, have been dramatically increasing emissions since 
Kyoto as their economies have boomed.169 
In the last four years, the Kyoto parties have held a series of Conferences of the Parties in 
an effort to put more flesh on Kyoto’s bones: the 13th Conference in Bali, Indonesia in 2007, 
the 14th in Poznan, Poland in 2008, the 15th in Copenhagen, Denmark in 2009, the 16th in 
Cancun, Mexico in 2010, and most recently the 17th in Durban, South Africa late last year. 
The formulaic agreements from the conferences cannot hide the increasing alarm over 
climate change.170 They affirm in some ways Kyoto’s principles, but the bottom line is that 
 
U.S. economy” and would be “unfair and ineffective.” Text of a Letter from the President to Senators 
Hagel, Helms, Craig, and Roberts, available at 
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PM), available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2011/12/12/pol-kent-kyoto-pullout. (last 
visited June 21, 2008). 
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2009, at ES-3 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY], 
http://epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/downloads11/US-GHG-Inventory-2011-Chapter-2-
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2006. McArthur & Harper, supra note 47, at 791 & n. 213. The current numbers are lower, but they 
also reflect several years of reduced economic activity from the 2008 recession. 2011 GREENHOUSE 
GAS INVENTORY, supra, at CS-3.  
168. See generally EMILY C. BARBOUR, COMMENTARY, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE: SELECTED LEGAL QUESTIONS, S. DOC NO. 7-5700, at 10–18 (Apr. 12, 2012) (discussing the 
nature of the U.S. commitment on Copenhagen emissions reductions).  
169. See generally McArthur & Harper, supra note 47, at 789–94 (providing a fuller analysis of emission 
data by country through 2005, including Canada and Japan).  
170. Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session, Held in Bali from 3 to 15 December 
2007, FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008), available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2012) (interpreting 
findings in the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report as showing “that warming of the climate system is 
unequivocal,” that “delay in reducing emissions significantly constrains opportunities to achieve 
lower stabilization,” and that “deep cuts in global emissions will be required to achieve the ultimate 
objective,” and emphasizing “the urgency to address climate change.”); The Copenhagen Accord, 
supra note 137 ( reciting “strong political will to urgently combat climate change in accordance with 
the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities;” recognizing 
“the scientific view that the increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius,” and 
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there still is no binding agreement on developed countries’ emission reductions or on what, if 
anything, developing countries will do to counter their growing share of emissions. Moreover, 
the Durban Conference pushed off until 2015 the timetable to agree on binding reductions, 
when the vision of Kyoto in 1997, and Rio in 1992, was that the world had to be well on its 
way to very substantial reductions below 1990 emission levels by 2012. As the IEA’s report 
documents, the costs of this failure are growing exponentially. 
One factor that has been cited as impeding political support for the Kyoto framework in 
the United States has been the perceived unfairness of differentiated responsibilities between 
developed and developing countries.171 At Durban, if there was a glimmer of hope, it was that 
the “Durban Platform for Enhanced Action” agrees that the parties will negotiate an 
agreement that will have “legal force” and in which all emitters (developed and developing 
countries) will have an emissions target.172 But this agreement is not required to be in place 
until 2015, and actual implementation (the time “to come into effect and be implemented”) is 
not until 2020.173 This further delay in implementation deadlines is a major retreat. By 2020, 
as the IEA has warned, the world is likely to have left a 2º Celsius world behind as a practical 
matter, unless technology advances at an unprecedented pace, and is likely to be unable even 
 
stating agreement that “deep cuts in global emissions are required according to science, and as 
documented by the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report . . . ” ); The Cancun Agreements, supra note 
137, at 2 (describing climate change as “an urgent and potentially irreversible threat to human 
societies” and noting United Nations Resolution 10/4’s recognition that climate change will affect 
human rights, that its impact will be felt by the most vulnerable part of the world population.) The 
Cancun Agreements describe the evidence of climate warming as “unequivocal,” and that “most of 
the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-twentieth century is very likely 
due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.” Id. § 3. They ask 
developed countries to “take note” of their Annex I targets and urges them to increase their targets. 
Id. §§ 36-37. They require developed countries to submit annual inventories and biennial progress 
reports, and developing countries to submit biennial update reports. Id. §§ 40(a), 60(c). They 
maintain the differentiated framework from Rio by acknowledging that developed countries caused 
the “largest share of historical global emissions” and therefore have “historical responsibility,” and 
the right of developing countries to make “social and economic development and poverty 
eradication” among their “first and overriding priorities.” Id. § III.A Preamble, III.B Preamble. They 
also discuss strengthening the “long-term global goal” in relation to a global average temperature 
rise of 1.5º Celsius, a possible lowering of the traditional 2º target. Id. § 4. These comments 
accurately reflect the failure to achieve the hopes of Rio and Kyoto, and the lack of leadership from 
the countries with the power to implement measures that might realistically begin the process of 
curtailing carbon emissions. 
171. See MacArthur & Harper, supra note 47, at 813–814, n. 343.  
172. Durban Platform, supra note 139.  Without specifying the final balance between developed and 
developing countries, the Durban Platform “acknowledg[es] that the global nature of climate change 
calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and 
appropriate institutional response,” thus seemingly admitting that developing countries are going to 
have to play a real role now, not later, that the Convention will require “strengthening the 
multilateral, rules-based regime”, and that “as early as possible,” but no later than 2015, there must 
be a “protocol, legal instrument or agreed outcome with legal force,” which is an acknowledgement 
that the final agreement must have some sanction or other enforcement mechanism.  Id. Preamble 
& § 4, Given how intractable the developed/developing split in responsibility has been to progress 
since Rio, however, the real issue facing the world is not whether developing countries, which have 
done their part to dramatically worsen twentieth-century emissions by population growth, will have 
to bear some share of the cost and burden of limiting emissions, but instead is whether they and 
developed countries will accept limits that realistically can hold temperatures to anything like a 2º 
Celsius increase. 
173. Id. § 4. 
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to halve emissions for a chance to limit temperature increases to a 3.5º rise. The price of 
several decades delay will be larger temperature increases, with a corresponding acceleration 
of glacial and polar melting, rising sea levels, rising methane emissions from melting 
permafrost, more extreme storms, and expanded desert areas. The world community will be 
in Jared Diamond’s category of a social organization that perceived the threat facing it, 
indeed was able to document it in excruciating detail and spread that knowledge through 
rapid computerized information transmittal, but was unwilling to set aside its self-interest, 
protect the world for future generations, and make the quite feasible, albeit expensive, 
changes necessary to escape severe environmental degradation. 
The failures to date are a problem for the world, but the effects of long-term climate 
change are likely to be harder for poorer developing countries to surmount than for wealthy 
nations. The dismal record on emissions reduction is also an American tragedy. The 
identification of a major problem goes back at least to Rio, a time when the United States still 
led the world economy and had outsized political influence. The Soviet Union was in the 
process of dissolution; Chinese economic power had not yet begun to alter the world stage. 
Particularly because developing countries understandably looked to their developed brethren 
who accounted for most historical GHG emissions to set an example, it was an ideal occasion 
for the United States to lead the world and set a positive example of American 
exceptionalism. The opportunity was squandered. Domestic politics were elevated above the 
world’s need to solve this crisis and above the United States’ long-term international 
interests. This failure of vision is reflected in the Byrd-Hagel Resolution and President Bush’s 
failure to live up to his campaign promises to support Kyoto.174 
The loss to the United States threatens to be economic as well as political. As Thomas 
Friedman has argued, the United States has had an opportunity to give American auto 
manufacturers, inventors and manufacturers of renewable energy infrastructure, owners of 
other American industrial plants, oil companies, and large utilities a clear economic incentive 
to sink funds and effort into inventing cutting edge technology.175 This was a major 
opportunity for American companies to take the lead in what clearly will be a major new 
international market. But just as automakers for years fought higher fuel-efficiency 
standards and ceded the market for high-mileage cars to foreign makers, so many other 
American companies spent more effort resisting regulation than courting its opportunities. 
The result is that firms in Germany, which imposed much higher standards and subsidized 
solar power, and China, whose firms with their mix of public and private controls are 
beginning to move aggressively into renewable energy production, are likely to lap their 
potential competitors in the United States. This loss is particularly tragic because the 
multinational oil companies based in the United States and large electricity generators still 
have the skills, distribution networks, and business acumen to out-compete many other 
companies in the same market if they receive the right market signals. 
 
174. See Byrd-Hagel Resolution, supra note 168; McArthur & Harper, supra note 47.  
175. The economic opportunity for the United States, and risk that it will miss it, is the meta-theme of 
Thomas Friedman’s Hot, Flat and Crowded. FRIEDMAN, supra note 126. Friedman’s plea would be 
even more impassioned today, now that the country has lost over three more years without seizing 
the main chance. 
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Finally, the idea that the United States can avoid GHG emission controls for reasons of 
domestic politics is extraordinarily short-sighted, and the benefits of inaction only temporary. 
The United States is the only major country in which the precautionary principle is ignored 
and a leading political party devotes its efforts to demonizing scientific outcomes. In the years 
since Kyoto, the European Union has begun making major legal changes to limit emissions. 
China, which faces a severe environmental problem,176 is putting a cap-and-trade market in 
place. It is highly unlikely that as competitor countries begin to feel the cost of limiting 
emissions, they will be willing to let the United States continue to pollute without sanction. 
France’s former President Nicolas Sarkozy floated a trial balloon several years ago by 
suggesting imposition of a “green tariff” on “those countries that don’t play by the rules of the 
game on environmental protection.”177 He did not gain support then, but similar ideas are 
likely to resurface when those bearing the costs of emissions control grow frustrated with free 
riders. The costs to the United States of its failure to deal with global warming rationally will 
only grow with time. The rise in temperatures will remind the rest of the world that this 
country, until recently the largest GHG emitter and still the country with the highest per-
capita emissions, has stood as a barrier to effective remedies for almost two decades. And not 
only has President Obama muted any support for strong global-warming measures, but only 
one major Republican candidate has treated global warming seriously. 
V.  The Race Against Time. 
Where does this leave the world? The increasing documentation of the problem has not 
been matched by ramped up efforts to solve it. The IEA was right to damn recent conferences 
with faint praise.178 It is one of history’s greatest ironies that one of the most hopeful signs on 
the horizon is that the Chinese government seems to have determined that climate change 
poses a mortal threat to China, and also that the renewables market is one in which its 
businesses should lead. The country that should have established a lead decades ago, the 
United States, is largely staying on the sidelines. 
The problem, of course, is that even if one is optimistic about the ability of international 
environmental law to devise solutions for single-issue problems over time, and to do so 
without a hierarchical court system or strong compliance measures, global warming is one 
problem in which all major economies need to rise to the challenge and the cost of delay in 
 
176. See, e.g., DIAMOND, supra note 68, at 377 (displaying Diamond’s simultaneous pessimism about the 
scope of China’s environmental degradation, and his hope that, because it is a large country with a 
powerful central government, if it gets behind limiting emissions it may be able to move much more 
quickly than other large economies). 
177. Turning Pledges into Law: EU Commits to Year-End Climate Deadline, SPIEGEL ONLINE 
INTERNATIONAL (Mar. 14, 2008), available at 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,541565,00.html (last visited August 20, 2012). 
178. It is not accidental that the IEA talks about the last year as not “a good one for those concerned 
about the contribution of energy-related carbon-dioxide (CO2) emissions to climate change,” and 
about Cancun as a conference “when a heroic leap was needed to set the world on an emissions 
trajectory compatible with the stated long-term target of limiting the average global temperature 
increase to 2ºC” [a leap that obviously was not attempted], that the pledges associated with the 
Copenhagen Accord and Cancun Agreements were “not sufficient to put the world on a climate-
sustainable path,” and that there was a “lack of ambition of climate pledges for 2020.” 2011 WORLD 
ECONOMIC REVIEW, supra note 126, at 206, 209 
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instilling new norms is huge. Even Bodansky, for all his optimism, admits, “Over the long 
term, it is difficult to see how a problem such as climate change could be addressed without 
giving international institutions greater standard-setting and enforcement authority. 
Nevertheless, efforts to do so would raise major practical and theoretical challenges.”179 
Without such a stronger international network, how can this soft system with its vague 
edges rise to the comprehensive solutions needed to treat global warming? How can one 
reconcile Bodansky’s optimism that there is a trend toward compliance with international 
environmental law, and that the last few decades have witnessed the development of effective 
new techniques of reaching agreement, with the demonstrated unwillingness of so many 
major countries to accept binding limits on GHG emissions, and his admission that 
“international environmental law has been weakest with respect to problem-solving 
effectiveness”?180 That the gradual evolution of norms, if they are moving in a progressive 
direction may “set boundary conditions for the development of more precise behavioral rules” 
and “frame the debate rather than [] govern conduct,”181 hardly seems enough to overcome so 
much self-interest, the drive of so many nations to improve standards of living, the tight 
budgets of a recessionary world economy, and the allure of trying to assign blame for past 
emissions rather than accept the cost of solving the problems as it exists today. 
Perhaps the most that can be said is that history is not written in advance, but instead by 
men and women in their own time. Even the reports charting the worsening problem still 
contend that there is time and technology enough today to limit global warming if we only 
have the will. This challenge poses the real test of whether international environmental law, 
even if “soft” in nature,” is “hard” enough in impact to keep GHG’s to livable limits. We had 
better hope that Bodansky’s optimism about the effectiveness of international environmental 
law’s relatively new techniques and its growing sophistication proves correct. 
 
179. BODANSKY, supra note 1, at 268. 
180. Id. at 261-62. Bodansky also admits that for all his emphasis on norms and general principles, if 
asked whether international environmental norms are truly customary in nature, “[t]o a significant 
degree, the honest answer is, we do not know.” Id. at 197. 
181. Id. at 203. 
